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Islamophobia underpins extremist verbal and physical attacks on Muslim communities. It has become widespread 
in Australian society, and normalised in everyday settings such as in mainstream media. There is general agreement 
among Australian researchers and community representatives that the concept of Islamophobia is a useful tool for 
understanding and developing ways to challenge anti-Islam attitudes. However, despite it becoming widespread, 
Islamophobia should not be treated as a singular problem as it takes many different forms (see Peucker and Smith 2019), 
which require targeted responses. This brief provides contemporary empirical insights into the extent of Islamophobia 
in Victoria, and how it is manifest, in order to help develop policy responses.  
In November 2019, we undertook an online representative survey of 4019 Victorians to examine Islamophobia in Australia. 
We asked questions about respondents’ attitudes towards cultural diversity, racial equality and privilege; trust and fairness; 
Muslims and Islam; and other ethno-cultural groups in Australian society; their experiences of racism and discrimination; 
their contact with Muslims and knowledge of Islam; their trust of institutions; political affiliation; and support for extreme 
politics (e.g., violence, non-democratic governance). To our knowledge, this was the largest representative survey 
undertaken in Victoria with the purpose of measuring Victorians’ perceptions of and attitudes towards Muslims and Islam. 
Based on respondents’ answers, we used latent class analysis to reveal groups in the Victorian population. Latent class 
analysis is an advanced statistical method that identifies related sets of responses in a dataset that may be hidden even 
from trained observers (Hagenaars and McCutcheon 2002; Uebersax 1993; Heinen 1996). 
 
Five groups were identified:
1. Islamophobic with supremacist ideology1 (9%) and clear intentions to take related actions;
2. Islamophobic with assimilationist views2 (23%) that perceive a cultural hierarchy into which Australian Muslims can 
fit if they adapt their ‘cultural ways’;
3. Undecided (17%), unpredictable in relation to Islamophobia and needing further research to determine their 
attitudes and how to avoid triggering Islamophobia;
4. Progressive with concerns about Islam (32%), generally assured about cultural diversity but some level of concern 
about Islam and Muslims; and
5. Progressive (19%), very positive about Muslims and Islam and a clear political position on cultural diversity that is 
critical of assimilationist thinking. 
We examined the demographic and attitudinal attributes of these groups in order to identify motivations and 
drivers of Islamophobia. We asked community organisations in Victoria that work in the broad areas of diversity and 
multiculturalism, and with a particular emphasis on Muslim and non-Muslim relations, to reality-test this five-group 
segmentation. The groupings made sense on the ground and provide a strong pathway for program and policy design.
1See Appendix A 
2See Appendix A
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• Islamophobia is currently widespread in Victoria, 
with a prevalence that is inconsistent with the 
generally positive attitudes that Victorians have 
towards diversity. This is a serious matter of public 
importance and requires urgent policy attention. 
• Islamophobia manifests in different ways, 
and to different degrees, across the Victorian 
population. We therefore propose that 
countering Islamophobia should involve varied 
approaches, stakeholders and narratives. 
• We have segmented Victorians into five groups 
(see above) in regard to Islamophobia. Only 
one of the five groups (about 20%) completely 
rejects Islamophobic attitudes. Four other groups 
reveal different depths of Islamophobia, ranging 
from those with progressive views but concerns 
about Muslims to those with far-right views. 
• A sensible public policy approach is to consider 
what strategies best prevent Victorians from 
being in the more problematic groups, and which 
encourage them to reject Islamophobic views. 
• Understanding the different forms of 
Islamophobia is important to undertake effective 
counter-Islamophobic interventions. Our data 
indicate that approximately half of those 
with some Islamophobic attitudes are not 
associated with assimilationist and supremacist 
ideology, and systematic changes to popular 
discourses (government and media) should 
have decisive effects upon those Victorians. 
• Approximately one in ten Victorians have 
consistently held negative views about Muslims 
and Islam. In addition to holding assimilationist 
and supremacist views, they are more likely 
than the other groups to indicate support for 
an organisation that resorts to violence. This 
group also have stronger levels of distrust of 
public institutions than do other Victorians. 
The appropriate policy focus on this minority 
group of Victorians may be containment and 
proscription, to make it more difficult for them to 
make Islamophobic statements or vilify Victorian 
Muslims, rally for anti-Muslim politics and inflame 
issues. They ought to be understood as a threat to 
good public order.
Key findings and proposed strategy
The policy issue
1. Why is it an issue of strategic  
   importance?
In this study, we conceptualise Islamophobia as a 
form of racism that negatively targets expressions of 
Muslimness and Islam (All-Party Parliamentary Group 
on British Muslims 2018). Our view is that Islamophobia 
draws on the core characteristics of racism, in terms 
of mechanisms, processes and outcomes (Dunn et 
al. 2007; Fredrickson 2002; Allen 2010). We examine 
Islamophobia through established measures of social 
distancing (e.g., respondents disagree with “I would 
accept living near a mosque”), perceived threat (e.g., 
respondents agree with “Muslims pose a threat to 
Australian society”) and perceptions of belonging 
and identity (e.g., respondents disagree with “Islam is 
compatible with western society”). While Islamophobia 
may be championed by racial supremacists (as shown 
in work by Peucker and Smith 2019), research shows 
that it has burgeoned well beyond that group, and is 
now prevalent in a cross-section of western societies, 
as well as being normalised in areas of mainstream 
media (All Together Now and UTS 2017; One Path 
Network 2017) and in political discourse (Briskman 
2015; Soutphommasane 2018). Islamophobia continues 
to be prevalent in the wider community, which can 
have long-lasting impacts on Muslim communities and 
the broader social cohesion of society in the long-term. 
Our report shows high levels of Islamophobic 
attitudes are prevalent in Victorian society. It is a 
legitimate and a critical priority focus for community 
relations. Too many Muslim Australians are exposed 
to the negative impacts of racism as a consequence 
of Islamophobia. Islamophobia also undermines 
harmonious community relations; it can give rise to 
deleterious public division; can be used to support 
extremist politics; and can give rise to public disorder. 
This Issues Paper demonstrates that there is a significant 
level of social distance (Hasan 2018), if not antipathy, 
towards Muslims and Islam in Victoria (see Table 1):
• 14.8% of respondents disagreed that Muslims are 
the same as other citizens.
• 21.7% agreed that Muslims do not fit into Australian 
society.
• One in three (29.4%) of the respondents agreed 
that Islam is compatible with western society and 
31.9% disagreed that it is compatible.
• About a fifth of the respondents said they would 
boycott the purchasing of halal products (18.4%).
• 53.8% stated they thought Muslim immigration 
into Australia was ‘About right’, while 37.3% stated 
it was ‘Too high’ or ‘Much too high’.
• One in five (22.1%) agreed that Muslims pose a 
threat to Australian society.
• 19.1% of respondents agreed that Muslims should 
be targeted more than others at airports and 
stations, but only 12.5% agreed that counter-
terrorism policies should focus exclusively on 
Muslims.
• One in five respondents hold negative views 
towards Muslims and Islam.
• Just under a half of the respondents would accept 
living near a mosque (48.4%).
• One-third (33.7%) agreed that women should not 
be allowed to wear the hijab in Australia, this rose 
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distancing (e.g., respondents disagree with “I would 
accept living near a mosque”), perceived threat (e.g., 
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and identity (e.g., respondents disagree with “Islam is 
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as well as being normalised in areas of mainstream 
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to be prevalent in the wider community, which can 
have long-lasting impacts on Muslim communities and 
the broader social cohesion of society in the long-term. 
Our report shows high levels of Islamophobic 
attitudes are prevalent in Victorian society. It is a 
legitimate and a critical priority focus for community 
relations. Too many Muslim Australians are exposed 
to the negative impacts of racism as a consequence 
of Islamophobia. Islamophobia also undermines 
harmonious community relations; it can give rise to 
deleterious public division; can be used to support 
extremist politics; and can give rise to public disorder. 
This Issues Paper demonstrates that there is a significant 
level of social distance (Hasan 2018), if not antipathy, 
towards Muslims and Islam in Victoria (see Table 1):
• 14.8% of respondents disagreed that Muslims are 
the same as other citizens.
• 21.7% agreed that Muslims do not fit into Australian 
society.
• One in three (29.4%) of the respondents agreed 
that Islam is compatible with western society and 
31.9% disagreed that it is compatible.
• About a fifth of the respondents said they would 
boycott the purchasing of halal products (18.4%).
• 53.8% stated they thought Muslim immigration 
into Australia was ‘About right’, while 37.3% stated 
it was ‘Too high’ or ‘Much too high’.
• One in five (22.1%) agreed that Muslims pose a 
threat to Australian society.
• 19.1% of respondents agreed that Muslims should 
be targeted more than others at airports and 
stations, but only 12.5% agreed that counter-
terrorism policies should focus exclusively on 
Muslims.
• One in five respondents hold negative views 
towards Muslims and Islam.
• Just under a half of the respondents would accept 
living near a mosque (48.4%).
• One-third (33.7%) agreed that women should not 
be allowed to wear the hijab in Australia, this rose 
to 48.9% when asked about wearing the niqab or 
burqa. 
The data also indicate that many Victorians have 
limited exposure to Muslims, with 39% stating they 
had no exposure to Muslims and 30.7% stating they 
know fewer than five Muslims. About a quarter (24.3%) 
stated they had never met or interacted with Muslims 
while a little less than a quarter stated they interacted 
with Muslims weekly (23.0%) and monthly (23.5%). 
Over half (58.4%) of respondents indicated they knew 
‘a little’ about the Muslim religion and practices, while 
15.3% stated they knew ‘nothing at all’.
Government agencies and organisations have the 
capacity, or should be resourced, to intervene to 
challenge Islamophobia. Responsibility for safely 
intervening with organised racist groups should largely 
sit with state agencies, such as Victoria Police and ASIO. 
Victorians who are undecided, or have some concerns 
about Muslims and Islam, need to be persuaded 
toward more-progressive positions. In this context, 
community members who are undecided about their 
attitudes to Muslims should be targeted through 
community initiatives that are instigated by local 
government and community sector organisations. 
These community initiatives could include stories and 
representations that demonstrate the ordinary hopes 
(family, education and work) and civic participation 
(volunteering and donating, perhaps in drought- and 
bushfire-related local charity work or homelessness) 
of Muslims to encourage greater acceptance and 
understanding and dispel racist viewpoints. These 
initiatives will work best if they leverage the strongly 
held universalist position3  on the rights of Muslim 
Australians as citizens. The profiling of celebrity 
(Australian Muslim) journeys, such as Muslim sports 
or media stars, will allow non-Muslim Victorians 
to develop local affiliation and human association. 
Sports and community groups will need government 
resourcing to undertake these initiatives in a way that is 
informed, strategic and monitored. A better and more 
sensible public discourse in politics and media about 
Islam and Muslims will also be very effective to counter 
Islamophobia. This requires political restraint and 
guidance, and better media practice, which together 
would substantially contain the spread of Islamophobia. 
A key and often forgotten group for anti-racism policy 
and action are progressives, those people that accept 
and advocate for diversity and belonging – they provide 
a key platform for promoting social cohesion within 
the community. Public policy and political messaging 
should challenge views of cultural supremacism and 
privilege. Anti-racist progressives are key influencers, 
whose work could be accelerated through their 
networks and other capacities.
It is timely to contemplate government-led initiatives 
that bring together research and community 
insights, and that share examples of good practice 
and intervention. The consultations and report of 
the UK’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on British 
Muslims (2018) shows what could be done in a 
2. Who or what has the power or 
    resources to act?
3See Appendix A 
3. Where can current policy be
    improved?
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co-ordinated way in Victoria. A whole-of-government 
and community campaign, to counter Islamophobia, 
is required. The Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 
15 March 2019 (2020: 31–3,134–43) also concluded 
that a whole of government approach to building 
social cohesion was required to address widespread 
Islamophobia.
We propose that different types of action should be 
taken for each of the five groups we have identified 
based on attitudes towards Islam.
Community and government stakeholders were 
asked to provide feedback on the five groups that we 
identified to understand Islamophobia. This approach 
to understanding was endorsed because it provided 
justification for a multi-pronged approach to countering 
Islamophobia and would lend itself to building 
coalitions for intervention directed at the different 
groups identified. Our analysis of the approach needed 
for each of these five groups follows.
1. The ‘Islamophobic’ group (9%) have a consistent 
and strong anti-Muslim/Islam stance. Members of 
this group have a consciousness and intentionality 
that is revealed in their attitude profile of blatant 
supremacism and hostility. This is a minority group 
for whom it would be difficult to change hearts 
and minds, and they should more likely be a focus 
of containment and proscription. Messaging from 
public authorities that construct members of this 
group as deviant threats to good public order will 
help contain this threat. It would be reasonable to 
assert that engaging with members of this group 
is dangerous and risky to reputation and safety. 
The key is to make it more difficult for them to 
make Islamophobic statements, to vilify Victorian 
Muslims, rally anti-Muslim politics and inflame 
issues. Responsibility for safely intervening with 
organised members of this group would largely 
sit with state agencies (law, policing, security). 
2. The ‘Islamophobic with assimilationist tendencies’ 
group (23%) have a disposition towards Muslims 
that is very close to the Islamophobic group 
described above. However, the ideological 
underpinning of this group is assimilationism and 
a perception that there is a cultural hierarchy into 
which Australian Muslims can fit if they adapt 
their “cultural ways”. This is a priority group for 
maintaining social cohesion and public order. 
Local action and pre-preparation for disputes (e.g. 
place-based initiatives to assuage debates about 
mosques) will limit the extent to which members 
of this group rally to the intentional politics of 
Islamophobes. Together, the two groups are a 
formidable minority that can be rallied to cause 
public disturbance. Members of this group are 
more likely to be Christian, and if people of 
faith can connect their visions and values, then 
this will assuage the effect of assimilationist 
ideology. Interfaith events, statements and 
representations will provide an opportunity for 
religious rivalries to be assuaged. Buy-in and 
advocacy from key influencers (organisations 
and individuals) will also have reach and impact 
(social media, storytelling) with this group. 
3. The ‘Undecided’ group (17%) are unpredictable in 
relation to Islamophobia, and ought to be a focus 
of more research so that we can better determine 
their attitudes and help predict and avoid the 
triggering of Islamophobia. Like the previous 
group, anything that confronts assimilationist 
assumptions will prove effective. Education that 
de-centres stereotypes and re-humanises Muslims 
will also build resilience to potential influence 
of Islamophobia in this group. Stories and 
representations that demonstrate the ordinary 
hopes (family, education and work) and civic 
participation (volunteering, donating) of Muslims 
would have positive effects by leveraging the 
strongly universalist position on rights in this group. 
Also, the profiling of celebrity (Australian Muslim) 
journeys, such as Muslim sports or media stars, will 
allow members of this group to find local affiliation 
and human association. Work at the level of locality 
(sports and community groups), and in schools, 
will have enduring benefit and virtue, and the 
latter can be an effective means to reach parents. 
4. The ‘Progressive with concerns about Islam’ 
group (32%) are generally assured about cultural 
diversity in Victoria but have some level of concern 
about Islam. This are a group where there can be 
optimism about the prospects of assuaging their 
anxieties. The residues of assimilationist thinking 
need to be exorcised from this group. They are a 
group open to influence and will likely attend local 
initiatives such as mosque open days and other 
interfaith events. However, the quickest wins with 
this group will be achieved through a better and 
more sensible public discourse about Islam and 
Muslims to alleviate concerns or misconceptions 
that they have picked up from Islamophobics. 
5. The ‘Progressives’ (19%) are very positive about 
Muslims and Islam in Australia, and they have a 
clear political position on cultural diversity that 
is critical of assimilationist thinking. This group 
is a strong counterforce against the discourses 
of the Islamophobic group. They are a somewhat 
neglected group in terms of policy action, and 
could be better utilised for anti-racism work. Policy, 
and political messaging, could better enhance 
and legitimise the challenge that members of 
this group present to cultural supremacism and 
privilege. Progressives are key influencers whose 
work could be accelerated through their networks 
and other capacities.
 
Action using these findings will negate the harmful 
impacts of Islamophobia. Discrimination includes 
impaired access to goods and services like education, 
housing, transport and employment. Those who 
experience such discrimination are more likely to suffer 
mental health issues, such as depression and anxiety 
(Paradies 2006). Systemic infringement of opportunity 
are inconsistent with a healthy society – it produces 
more-guarded and less-engaged citizens, and is a 
threat to social cohesion, economic productivity and 
good public order (Paradies et al. 2009). Discrimination 
in the workplace leads to absenteeism and attrition, 
4. Proposals: what further action is      
    needed and by whom?
5. What are the impacts of a  
    change in policy?
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public realm Islamophobia creates immobility and 
unnecessary diversions (Itaoui 2016), and racism in 
housing has invidious social consequences, such as 
unequal access to amenity, and segregation (Galster 
1990; McDonald et al 2016)).
To address Islamophobia in the Victorian community, 
we recommend further research in the following three 
areas: 
1. Qualitative research to identify the disruptors 
that could successfully prevent the Undecided 
group from moving towards the Islamophobic 
groups. The concern is that this substantive 
group of undecideds may be recruited to 
Islamophobic action. As yet, it is unclear what 
some of the triggers might be for this group, 
and a better understanding of motivations and 
drivers would assist in developing interventions 
that direct this group towards progressive 
standpoints rather than Islamophobic ones. 
2. Qualitative research on the mechanisms and 
discourses that can shift the Islamophobic 
category into the “Islamophobic with assimilation” 
category. Typical anti-racist assumptions would 
be to challenge the supremacism-based hostility 
as well as challenging assimilationist thinking. 
Assimilationist thinking might facilitate a shift 
from supremacism, by leveraging the universalist 
perspectives that sit within assimilationism – 
in which there would acceptance of Muslims’ 
human rights and citizenship. This group 
would still be exposed to the assumptions of 
cultural hierarchy, but this may be preferable 
to a white supremacist outlook. The value of 
this approach would need to be evaluated. 
3. Consultations with Progressive groups on how they 
can be better enabled to counter Islamophobia 
themselves. This group are too often ignored as 
they hold attitudes and support behaviours that 
are not a threat to good public order. But they 
are an invaluable resource for anti-racist action, 
and this has been under-utilised. Consultation 
that examines capacities, limits, resourcing and 
structural support is recommended.
6. Related areas that need further 
    research and exploration
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Table 1. Attitudes Towards Muslims and Islam  
Victorians in 2019 (%)





I would accept living near a 
mosque 16.5 31.9 25.3 14.9 11.3
Muslims are the same as other 
citizens 23.1 42.1 20.1 9.8 5
Muslims do not fit into Australian 
society 7.7 14 28.1 31.4 18.7
Muslims pose a threat to  
Australian society 8.2 13.9 29.3 28.7 20
Do you agree with the practice 
of targeting Muslims more than 
others at airports and stations
6.4 12.7 26.9 29.7 24.3
Counter-terrorism policies in  
Australia should focus exclusively 
on Muslims
3.9 7.6 21.2 37.8 29.5
I would feel very comfortable 
speaking with a Muslim 31.3 41.5 19.4 5 2.8
I would boycott the purchasing of 
halal products 7.9 10.5 26.6 29.1 25.9
Women should not be allowed to 
wear head coverings like the hijab 
in Australia
16.5 17.2 25.8 22.4 18.1
Women should not be allowed to 
wear face coverings like the niqab 
and burqa in Australia
25.2 23.7 22.7 15.2 13.2
Islam is compatible with western 
society 7.9 21.5 38.8 20.4 11.5
I am worried that our rights and 
freedom are threatened by  
Muslims in Australia
11.3 20.8 27.7 24.2 16
I worry about terrorism in  
Australia 22.9 40.2 21.2 10.5 5.2
Compared to myself Muslims have 
a lot less power and influence 4.9 15.7 46.8 24 8.7
Most Muslims are interested in 
integrating into Australian society 11.9 36.5 33.2 11.6 6.8
Source: Dunn et al. 2020 
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Term Definition
Supremacist ideology A belief that a particular group of people identified by 
their shared race, ethnicity, sex, gender or religion, is 
superior to other groups and should therefore dominate 
those groups.
Assimilationist Refers to a person who believes in racial or cultural 
homogenisation, in this case Muslims would need to fit 
into Australian society by adapting their “cultural ways” 
to what are asserted as mainstream Australian values.
Universalist position Refers to the notion that human rights are universal 
and should be applied to everyone, in this case that 
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